Why Healthcare Costs So Much — Part 2 of 4
The Facility Fee
Why the Same Test Costs Three Times More Down the Street
Image: AI-generated for CardioAdvocate
This article is for educational purposes only and does not constitute medical, legal, or financial advice. Hospital pricing and healthcare policy are rapidly evolving; legislation and market dynamics described here reflect conditions as of November 2026. Consult your healthcare provider regarding medical decisions and your insurer or hospital billing department regarding cost estimates and coverage.
Imagine this. You need an echocardiogram — a routine ultrasound of your heart. Your cardiologist orders it. Simple enough.
If the echo is performed at an independent cardiology clinic — the kind with a small office, a waiting room, and a sonographer who's done ten thousand of these — you might pay somewhere between $200 and $500 out of pocket, depending on your insurance. Medicare's reimbursement for the same study in a physician's office runs roughly $198.
Now imagine the same echo, performed by the same type of sonographer, read by the same type of cardiologist, using the same type of machine — but at a hospital outpatient department across town. The hospital bills not just the professional fee for reading the study, but an additional facility fee for the privilege of having it done in a hospital-owned building. Under Medicare's Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System, that echo now reimburses at roughly $482 to $558 — two to nearly three times the physician office rate. For commercially insured patients, the gap is often wider.
Same test. Same clinical information. Same picture of your heart. But the building it was performed in changed the price.
This is the facility fee — and it is one of the most consequential, least understood forces driving American healthcare costs. In Part 1 of this series, we followed the money through the drug pricing machine. Here, in Part 2, we follow it through the hospital's front door.
What Exactly Is a Facility Fee?
When a physician performs a service in their own independent office, they submit a single bill that covers everything — the doctor's time, the equipment, the staff, the rent. It's called a global fee, and Medicare pays it under the Physician Fee Schedule.
When the same service is performed in a hospital outpatient department (HOPD), the billing splits in two. The physician still bills a professional fee for their work. But the hospital separately bills a facility fee — sometimes called a technical fee — that covers the building, the equipment, the nursing staff, the overhead. This second bill is paid under the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS), and it is almost always higher than what the same overhead would cost in a freestanding office.
The rationale is straightforward enough. Hospitals maintain emergency departments that must stay open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, regardless of whether anyone walks in. They maintain surgical suites, intensive care units, pharmacy services, infection control programs, and compliance departments that independent offices do not. They are required by federal law — the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) — to stabilize and treat anyone who arrives at their emergency department, regardless of ability to pay. All of that costs money, and the facility fee is the mechanism that helps pay for it.
So far, so reasonable. The problem isn't that facility fees exist. The problem is what happens when they're applied to services that don't require anything a hospital uniquely provides.
A Key Distinction: Professional Fee vs. Technical Fee
To understand why billing gets so complicated — and where the money actually goes — you need to know that nearly every diagnostic test or procedure has two reimbursement components:
The Professional Component — the physician's cognitive and interpretive work. When your cardiologist reads a stress test, they bill for the professional interpretation (sometimes called "modifier -26"). This payment is roughly the same regardless of where the test is performed.
The Technical Component — the equipment, the room, the technician, the supplies required to actually perform the test. This is where the money diverges. When the test is done at a hospital outpatient department, the technical component is the facility fee — paid under OPPS at higher rates. When the same test is done at an independent physician's office or clinic, there's still a technical component — it's just paid under the Physician Fee Schedule at a lower rate.
In other words, "facility fee" and "technical fee" aren't two different charges. They're the same concept — payment for the technical resources needed to perform a service — reimbursed at different rates depending on where the service happens. A hospital's technical component (the facility fee) is higher because the OPPS rate accounts for the overhead of running a hospital. A clinic's technical component is lower because the Physician Fee Schedule assumes leaner infrastructure.
When a physician works in their own independent practice, they often bill globally — meaning both the professional and technical components appear on a single claim, and the practice captures all of the revenue. When that same physician performs a service at a hospital, they bill only the professional component. The hospital bills the technical/facility fee separately. The physician's practice doesn't see a dollar of that facility payment.
This creates a straightforward financial incentive. Consider a cardiologist who sees a patient admitted with atypical chest pain. The patient needs a stress test. If the cardiologist orders it at the hospital, the hospital captures the facility fee and the cardiologist bills only the professional component for interpreting the results. But if the cardiologist discharges the patient and schedules the stress test across the street at their own clinic, the practice now captures both the professional fee and the technical fee. The technical payment is lower than the hospital's facility fee — but it's revenue the practice wouldn't have received at all in the hospital setting.
This dynamic — sometimes called self-referral economics — is part of why federal anti-kickback statutes and the Stark Law exist. These laws prohibit physicians from referring patients for certain services to entities in which they have a financial interest. But the rules are complicated, the exceptions are numerous, and cardiology imaging has historically operated within notable safe harbors. The point isn't that every physician who orders a test at their own office is gaming the system. Most are making clinically appropriate decisions — and there are genuine clinical reasons to keep imaging close to the ordering physician. A cardiologist who performs and interprets an echocardiogram on their own patient brings clinical context that an outside reading facility cannot replicate: they know the patient's history, they can correlate the images with the physical exam in real time, and they can adjust the study on the spot if something unexpected appears. The point is that the structure of reimbursement creates incentives that pull in predictable directions — and patients rarely know any of this is happening.
Hospitals aren't the only ones navigating reimbursement incentives. The difference is that when a hospital charges a facility fee, there's a line item for it on the bill. When a clinic captures the technical component, it's typically bundled into a single charge the patient never thinks to question.
The Numbers: How Much More Does Hospital-Based Care Cost?
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), the nonpartisan body that advises Congress on Medicare, has documented this payment gap extensively. In its reports to Congress, MedPAC has found that hospital outpatient department payments are "often considerably higher" than physician office payments for the same service — with some procedures reimbursed at rates up to 90% higher in an HOPD than in an independent office.
The gap shows up across nearly every specialty, but it's especially visible in cardiology:
Echocardiogram (CPT 93306): Medicare pays roughly $198 in a physician's office vs. $482–$558 at a hospital outpatient department — a difference of 2.4 to 2.8 times.
Office visit (established patient, Level 4): MedPAC data shows HOPD rates approximately 80% higher than physician office rates for the same E&M code.
Exercise stress test: Estimated at $200–$600 in a physician's office vs. $500–$1,500 at a hospital facility.
For commercially insured patients, the spread is often wider — because commercial rates are negotiated as a percentage of the hospital's chargemaster, and hospital chargemasters are considerably higher than Medicare's fixed rates.
The pacemaker data from CMS is even more striking. When the agency released hospital charge data in 2013, it revealed that a permanent pacemaker implantation at one Miami hospital averaged roughly $60,000 — while a facility less than a third of a mile away charged more than $127,000 for the same procedure. Medicare paid both hospitals approximately the same amount. But for uninsured patients, or those with high-deductible plans, the hospital's posted charges were the starting point for their bill.
The Chargemaster: Why the Hospital Down the Street Charges Twice as Much
If you've ever wondered why the same MRI can cost $800 at one hospital and $3,500 at another hospital ten minutes away, the answer lives in a document you've probably never seen: the chargemaster.
Every hospital maintains a chargemaster — a massive internal price list containing thousands of line items for every billable service, supply, and procedure the hospital can provide. A large hospital's chargemaster may contain tens of thousands of entries. And here's the critical thing to understand: chargemaster prices are not based on cost.
They are administrative constructions — starting points for negotiation with insurance companies, set by each hospital independently, with no regulatory requirement that they bear any relationship to what the service actually costs to deliver. One hospital may raise its chargemaster prices by 20% to give itself more negotiating room with commercial payers. The hospital across town might keep prices lower because its payer mix is different. Neither number tells you what the hospital spends to perform the service.
This matters because of how commercial insurance works. When an insurer negotiates with a hospital, the resulting contract often pays a percentage of the chargemaster — say, 60% of charges, or 200% of Medicare rates. If a hospital sets its chargemaster price for an echo at $3,000, and the insurer has negotiated a 50% discount, the "negotiated rate" is $1,500. If the hospital across town sets its chargemaster at $1,800, that same 50% discount yields $900. Same test, same quality, $600 difference — driven entirely by the hospital's internal pricing decision.
For Medicare and Medicaid, it matters less — those programs pay their own fixed rates regardless of the chargemaster. But for the roughly 164 million Americans with employer-sponsored or individual commercial insurance, chargemaster-based pricing is the water they swim in. And the patients who are hurt most are the uninsured — because they are often billed the full chargemaster price, with no negotiated discount at all.
The Media Spotlight: "Paying Till It Hurts"
In 2013, New York Times reporter Elisabeth Rosenthal launched a year-long investigative series called "Paying Till It Hurts" — one of the most ambitious examinations of American healthcare pricing ever published. The series laid bare the absurdity of the system: a colonoscopy that cost $6,385 in the U.S. versus a few hundred dollars in many other developed countries. A hip replacement in Belgium — including the implant, the surgeon, the hospital stay, a week of physical rehab, and a round-trip plane ticket — for $13,660, a fraction of the U.S. price. Emergency room visits where a simple stitch with skin glue generated a bill approaching $1,700.
Rosenthal drew much of her reporting from reader submissions — hundreds of Americans sending in their hospital bills, each one a small case study in a system where prices were disconnected from costs, and patients were the last to know what anything would actually cost them.
The series won journalism awards and was later expanded into Rosenthal's book An American Sickness, which became a New York Times bestseller. But the hospital pricing dynamics she documented in 2013 haven't gone away. If anything, they've intensified.
In December 2020, 60 Minutes aired a segment examining hospital pricing — prompting the American Hospital Association to issue a formal public response. In April 2025, PBS NewsHour revisited facility fees specifically, with patients describing how they were charged facility fees for telehealth visits — services where they never set foot in a hospital building at all.
The media attention has been building for a reason: Americans are noticing the bills. And they're asking the obvious question — why does where I sit in a chair change what I'm charged?
The Cost of Getting Sick: Heart Failure as a Case Study
Facility fees add up on individual tests and visits. But the real financial weight of hospital-based care becomes clear when a patient actually needs to be in the hospital — when there is no outpatient alternative, and the facility costs are not a surcharge on convenience but the price of survival.
Heart failure is arguably the most expensive cardiovascular diagnosis in America. The numbers are sobering:
$14,631 — estimated mean cost per heart failure hospitalization in the United States.
22.3% — the 30-day readmission rate for heart failure, meaning nearly 1 in 4 patients discharged with heart failure are back in the hospital within a month.
$53.1 billion — projected total annual cost of heart failure care in the United States by 2030, driven by an aging population and rising prevalence. (For more on heart failure, see our HFrEF and HFpEF deep dives.)
6.7 million — Americans currently living with heart failure, a number projected to exceed 8 million by 2030.
Heart failure is the single most common reason for hospital admission among Medicare beneficiaries — ahead of pneumonia, chronic kidney disease, and atrial fibrillation, and it has been for decades. Each admission generates facility charges — room and board, nursing, monitoring, labs, imaging, pharmacy, and the overhead of a hospital infrastructure built to handle acutely ill patients.
This is where the conversation about hospital costs requires honesty. A patient in acute decompensated heart failure — short of breath, fluid-overloaded, with a dropping blood pressure — needs a hospital. They need IV diuretics titrated by a nurse, continuous telemetry monitoring, point-of-care labs, biomarker tracking, and a physician available around the clock. That level of care costs what it costs. It cannot be delivered at an independent clinic.
But here's where the system fails: the readmission. Nearly a quarter of heart failure patients bounce back within 30 days, often because of inadequate outpatient follow-up, medication non-adherence driven by cost, prior authorization barriers, or gaps in discharge planning. Each readmission generates another full cycle of facility charges. Preventing even a fraction of those readmissions through better outpatient care, medication access, and transitional support could save billions — and more importantly, it could save patients the physical toll of another hospitalization.
Congress recognized this in 2012 when it created the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), which penalizes hospitals with excess 30-day readmission rates by reducing their Medicare reimbursements by up to 3%. In fiscal year 2018, the program imposed a cumulative $564 million in penalties. The policy has driven genuine improvements — readmission rates have declined since the program's inception — but it has also been criticized for disproportionately penalizing safety-net hospitals that serve higher-risk populations with fewer resources for post-discharge care.
The Other Side: Why Hospitals Charge What They Charge
It would be easy, and satisfying, to paint hospitals as the villains of this story. They are not. The reality is considerably more complicated — and more sympathetic — than a headline about facility fees suggests.
Start with the margins. The median hospital operating margin in the United States has hovered near 1% to 2.6% in recent years — the kind of margin that would make any business nervous. According to Kaufman Hall, which tracks hospital finances nationally, 43% of hospitals are currently operating at a loss, up from 33% before the COVID-19 pandemic. For rural hospitals, the picture is worse: more than 40% operate in the red, and closures have accelerated, with low patient volume — not excessive profit — cited as the most common reason.
These are not organizations swimming in cash. They are organizations trying to keep the lights on in an environment of relentless cost pressure.
Medicare pays less than cost
The American Hospital Association reports that Medicare paid just 82 cents for every dollar hospitals spent caring for Medicare patients in 2022 — a shortfall of roughly $99.2 billion in that single year. MedPAC's own data puts the overall Medicare margin for hospitals at negative 12.1% in 2024. Medicare has not fully covered the cost of hospital care since 2002.
Medicaid reimbursement is typically even lower. And the gap between what government programs pay and what care actually costs doesn't disappear — it gets shifted.
Cost shifting: the commercial payer subsidy
This is the economic reality that underlies hospital pricing: hospitals must make up on commercial insurance what they lose on Medicare, Medicaid, and uncompensated care. This practice — called cost shifting — means that your employer-sponsored insurance premiums are, in part, subsidizing the gap between what Medicare pays and what hospital care costs.
It also explains, at least partially, why chargemaster prices seem so disconnected from reality. Hospitals don't set chargemaster prices to reflect what a service costs. They set them to create negotiating room with commercial payers — because the commercial payer is the only one paying enough to cover the shortfall from everyone else.
Uncompensated care is growing
Hospitals provide care to patients who cannot pay — either as charity care (services provided for free or at reduced cost) or as bad debt (services billed but never collected). Nationally, charity care deductions for large hospitals increased 31% from 2022 to 2024, and bad debt rose 18% over the same period. In Wisconsin alone, hospitals reported $1.77 billion in uncompensated care in 2024, a 30% increase over the prior year.
The expiration of enhanced Affordable Care Act premium subsidies at the end of 2025 is expected to accelerate this trend, as more Americans lose insurance coverage and hospitals absorb the cost of their care.
The EMTALA mandate
Every hospital with an emergency department is required by EMTALA to screen and stabilize anyone who presents for care, regardless of insurance status or ability to pay. This is a moral and legal imperative — and it is unfunded. The cost of emergency care for uninsured patients is absorbed by the hospital and recovered, to the extent it can be, through higher charges to insured patients.
The not-for-profit tightrope
There's another dimension to this story that rarely makes headlines. Roughly 58% of U.S. community hospitals are not-for-profit — meaning they don't distribute earnings to shareholders, they reinvest surplus revenue into operations and community benefit, and they are held to federal and state standards for charitable care in exchange for their tax-exempt status. Many of the hospitals in your community — including most rural and regional systems — operate under this model.
Not-for-profit hospitals face a set of constraints that their for-profit counterparts do not. Federal tax-exemption rules and anti-kickback statutes require them to pay physicians and staff at fair market value — no more, no less. This sounds straightforward, but in practice it creates a narrow band that is difficult to navigate. Pay below fair market value and you cannot recruit the cardiologists, surgeons, and hospitalists your community needs — they'll go to the system down the road, or to a larger market offering better compensation. Pay above it and you risk regulatory scrutiny, IRS challenges to your tax-exempt status, and financial instability in a system already running on thin margins.
In rural settings, this tension is acute. A regional hospital may be the only facility within a hundred miles capable of performing cardiac catheterizations or managing acute heart failure. But it's competing nationally for specialists who have options in Denver, Portland, or Phoenix — markets with higher volumes, more resources, and lifestyle amenities that a small town can't match. Recruiting a cardiologist to a rural community often means offering competitive compensation, loan forgiveness, and relocation support — costs that must be absorbed by a system with a fraction of the patient volume of an urban medical center.
In urban and suburban settings, the pressure is different but no less real. Not-for-profit hospitals compete for talent against neighboring systems, academic medical centers, and increasingly against for-profit physician groups that can offer equity stakes, profit-sharing arrangements, and productivity bonuses that a not-for-profit structure simply cannot replicate. The result is a constant balancing act: stay competitive enough to retain your best people without overextending a budget that has no investor capital to fall back on.
For-profit hospital systems and physician groups face their own pressures — quarterly earnings expectations, investor demands, and the need to demonstrate growth. Neither model is inherently better or worse for patients. Both deliver excellent care at their best and face perverse incentives at their worst. The point is that the not-for-profit hospitals serving many American communities are not cash-rich institutions exploiting a billing loophole. They are organizations trying to maintain quality care, recruit and retain talented providers, and keep their doors open — all within a reimbursement system that often pays them less than the cost of the care they deliver. (We'll explore the for-profit vs. not-for-profit dynamic in more depth in Part 4 of this series.)
The vanishing private practice
A natural response to all of this is: "Why not just go to an independent cardiology practice for my echo or stress test?" Good luck finding one.
Private cardiology practices are disappearing. The ACC's own Practice Census found that hospital employment of cardiologists rose from 11% in 2007 to 35% by 2012, and by 2019 that figure had climbed to nearly 63%. The trend has only accelerated. The economics are brutal. To maintain hospital privileges — which most cardiologists need for procedures, admissions, and emergencies — a physician must round on inpatients, take call (often uncompensated or poorly compensated), and perform procedures at the hospital. That work generates revenue for the hospital, not the private practice. The cardiologist is essentially donating time and expertise to an institution that is simultaneously competing with their clinic for outpatient referrals.
Multispecialty groups face a different version of the same squeeze. They may enjoy the technical fees from cardiology ancillary studies — the echos, the stress tests, the Holter monitors — performed and read within their walls. But they don't like it when their cardiologists are spending half their week rounding at the hospital, taking uncompensated call, and doing procedures that generate zero revenue for the group. The math stops working. Some groups respond by shrinking or eliminating their cardiology divisions entirely.
The result is a structural consolidation that feeds itself. As private practices close and multispecialty groups shed cardiology, hospitals become the only entities large enough — and financially resilient enough — to absorb the losses that come with maintaining a full-service cardiology program. Cath labs, electrophysiology suites, advanced imaging, 24/7 call coverage — these are expensive to build and expensive to staff. A two-physician private practice cannot sustain them. A hospital system, cross-subsidizing with facility fees and commercial payer revenue, can.
So some of the "extra cost" of that hospital-based echo is, in a very real sense, the price of ensuring the service exists at all. It's not a fee for a fancier building — it's a fee for being the last institution standing that can offer procedural cardiology to the community. Whether that justifies the price differential is debatable. That it helps explain it is not.
This dynamic — the systematic absorption of independent practices into hospital systems — sets the stage for Part 3, where we examine what happens when another financial force enters the picture: private equity.
The blunt reality is this: a hospital's prices are not just paying for your echocardiogram. They are paying for the ER that stayed open all night, the charity care case that came in without insurance, the Medicare patient whose reimbursement covered 82% of the cost, the building and staff that must exist whether the waiting room is full or empty — and increasingly, for being the only place left that can perform the test at all. Is it fair? That depends on whom you ask. But it is the system as built.
Hospital Price Transparency: The Rule, the Reality, and the Resistance
In January 2021, a federal rule took effect requiring every hospital in the United States to post its prices — in a machine-readable format, publicly accessible, for 300 common "shoppable" services. The idea was simple: if patients could compare prices across hospitals, market forces would push costs down.
The implementation has been rocky.
Compliance was low for years. Hospitals faced minimal penalties — initially just $300 per day, a rounding error for a billion-dollar health system. Many posted files that were technically available but practically unusable — buried in hard-to-find pages, in formats that required specialized software to read, or with data so incomplete it was meaningless.
The current administration has pushed enforcement harder. In 2026, CMS sent noncompliance warning letters to more than 500 hospitals — but as of mid-2026, has fined just one. Updated rules now require hospitals to post median and percentile-based allowed amounts from actual insurance remittance data, with CEO attestation. Penalties have been increased, and a hospital that waives its right to a hearing can reduce the fine by 35%.
The question is whether transparency alone can solve the pricing problem. Even when prices are posted, most patients lack the tools, time, or clinical knowledge to comparison-shop for a stress test the way they'd compare prices on a television. A patient with chest pain doesn't Google competing echo prices. And even for non-urgent care, insurance networks, physician referral patterns, and geographic convenience often matter more than price.
Transparency is a necessary first step. It is not a sufficient one.
Site-Neutral Payment: Paying the Same for the Same
If the same service delivered in two different buildings costs the healthcare system dramatically different amounts, the logical policy response is straightforward: pay the same rate regardless of where the service is performed. This is the principle behind site-neutral payment reform.
The idea has bipartisan support. MedPAC has recommended site-neutral payments repeatedly. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that equalizing payment rates between HOPDs and physician offices for certain services could save Medicare tens of billions of dollars over a decade. In 2023, the U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation incorporating site-neutral principles — though it never became law.
CMS has taken incremental steps. In its CY2026 OPPS final rule, the agency applied site-neutral payment rates to drug administration services at off-campus hospital outpatient departments — a narrow but meaningful change projected to save approximately $290 million. The principle: if an off-campus HOPD is functionally identical to a physician office — same building type, same services, no ER, no surgical suite — it should not bill at hospital rates.
Nine states have gone further, passing legislation that prohibits or limits facility fees for certain outpatient services. Connecticut has banned facility fees for routine office visits since 2017. New Mexico enacted HB 306 in March 2026, effective January 2027, restricting facility fees for evaluation and management services at off-campus departments. Others are following.
Hospitals oppose these reforms vigorously. The AHA argues that site-neutral cuts would reduce revenue that hospitals use to cross-subsidize money-losing services — and they're not wrong. If a hospital loses facility fee revenue on outpatient echos, that revenue has to come from somewhere else, or the hospital cuts services. The counterargument is equally direct: paying a hospital twice the physician office rate for the same echo performed in a building that looks and functions like a physician office is difficult to justify to the patient receiving the bill — regardless of what the hospital does with the revenue.
This is a genuine policy tension, not a simple good-vs.-evil narrative. Both sides are making real points. The question is whether the current payment structure — which effectively taxes patients and employers for hospital overhead regardless of whether the hospital's unique capabilities are being used — is the best way to fund the services that only hospitals can provide.
What Patients Can Do
The facility fee system is a policy problem that requires policy solutions. But patients are not powerless in the meantime.
Ask where. When your doctor orders an imaging study, blood work, or a procedure, ask whether it will be performed at a hospital outpatient department or an independent facility. This single question can affect your out-of-pocket cost by hundreds or even thousands of dollars. Your physician may not know the price difference — but their staff can usually tell you whether the site carries a facility fee.
Ask how much. Under federal law, hospitals must provide a good-faith cost estimate for scheduled services before you receive care. Ask for it in writing. If you're comparing facilities, ask both for the estimate — you may be surprised at the gap.
Know your plan. Some insurance plans charge different copays or coinsurance rates depending on whether care is delivered at a hospital or a freestanding facility. If your plan does, choosing an independent imaging center over a hospital outpatient department for a routine echo or stress test can mean the difference between a $50 copay and a $500 one.
Check for freestanding alternatives. Many cardiology and imaging services — echocardiograms, stress tests, vascular ultrasounds, stress tests, routine lab work — can be performed at freestanding clinics, ambulatory surgery centers, or independent imaging centers that do not charge facility fees. The clinical quality is equivalent. The price is often dramatically lower.
Advocate. The most effective thing any patient can do is also the simplest: tell your elected officials that healthcare prices should be transparent and consistent. Site-neutral payment reform, price transparency enforcement, and facility fee disclosure requirements are all moving through legislative pipelines at the state and federal level. Public support accelerates them.
In Fairness: Hospitals Are Not the Enemy
Hospitals are some of the most essential institutions in American life. They are where we go when nothing else will do — when the heart attack happens, when the accident occurs, when a premature infant needs a NICU. Many hospitals are the largest employers in their communities. Many operate at a loss. Many serve populations that no other institution will serve.
The facility fee problem is not a story about greed. It is a story about a payment system that creates perverse incentives — one that pays hospitals more for performing routine services that could be done equally well in a lower-cost setting, and then uses the revenue from those inflated payments to cross-subsidize services that lose money. The incentive is to bring more care into the hospital rather than keep it in less expensive settings, even when the patient's clinical needs don't require it.
MedPAC's data shows the trend: office visits performed in hospital outpatient departments rose from 9.6% of all office visits in 2012 to 13.1% in 2019 — driven in part by hospitals acquiring independent physician practices and converting them to HOPDs, which allows the same office to begin billing facility fees for the same services it was performing before. The doctor doesn't change. The staff doesn't change. The building doesn't change. The bill does.
This is the structural problem that site-neutral reform aims to fix — not by punishing hospitals, but by aligning payment with clinical reality. If a service requires a hospital's unique capabilities, pay the hospital rate. If it doesn't, don't.
THE BOTTOM LINE
The facility fee is not a conspiracy. It is a feature of a payment system designed in a different era, when hospital outpatient departments looked meaningfully different from physician offices — and when hospitals needed a mechanism to fund the unique services they provide. The problem is that the system hasn't kept up with reality. Today, a growing share of outpatient care is performed in hospital-affiliated settings that are functionally identical to independent offices but bill at dramatically higher rates.
Hospitals — especially the not-for-profit systems that serve the majority of American communities — face genuine financial pressure: thin margins, Medicare shortfalls, rising uncompensated care, unfunded mandates, and the constant challenge of recruiting and retaining providers in a competitive market. These are real problems that require real solutions. But the harder question is how we fund the services that only hospitals can provide — because charging patients and employers two to three times more for a routine echo based on the building it was performed in is an increasingly unsustainable answer, even if it has been the only available one.
Site-neutral payment reform, price transparency, and state-level facility fee restrictions are all moving in the right direction. The pace is slow. The lobbying is intense. But the principle is simple: the same care should cost the same, regardless of the sign on the building.
Next in the series: In Part 3, we examine what happens when private equity enters the exam room — buying physician practices, cutting costs, and reshaping the economics of who provides your care and why.
Why Healthcare Costs So Much
Part 1: The Drug Pricing Machine
Part 2: The Facility Fee — You are here
Part 3: Private Equity's Healthcare Play — Coming soon
Part 4: The Doctor Myth — For-Profit, Not-for-Profit, and What Physicians Actually Cost — Coming soon
The building doesn't make the diagnosis. It shouldn't make the price.
— CardioAdvocate
CardioAdvocate provides medical education content for informational purposes only. This article does not constitute medical, legal, or financial advice. Hospital pricing and healthcare policy are complex and evolving — specific details may change after publication. Always consult qualified professionals for medical, legal, and financial decisions. CardioAdvocate has no financial relationship with any hospital, health system, or healthcare organization mentioned in this article. © 2026 CardioAdvocate. All rights reserved.
Why Healthcare Costs So Much — Part 1 of 4
The Drug Pricing Machine
PBMs, Rebate Walls, and the Fight for Affordable Medication
Image: AI-generated for CardioAdvocate
This article is for educational purposes only and does not constitute medical, legal, or financial advice. Drug pricing and healthcare policy are rapidly evolving; legislation and market dynamics described here reflect conditions as of October 2026. Consult your healthcare provider regarding medication decisions and your pharmacist or benefits administrator regarding insurance coverage and drug costs.
Americans spend more on prescription drugs than any other nation on earth — and it isn't close.
In 2022, the United States spent an estimated $5,244 per capita on pharmaceuticals, compared to roughly $1,400 in the United Kingdom and $1,800 in Germany. A RAND Corporation analysis found that U.S. drug prices are, on average, 2.78 times higher than prices in 33 other OECD nations. For brand-name drugs specifically, the ratio climbs to 4.22 times.
And no — it's not because Americans take more medication. OECD data on defined daily doses — the standard international measure of drug consumption — shows that U.S. per-capita utilization is comparable to or lower than many peer nations. A 2018 Health Policy study confirmed that the U.S. spending gap is driven by "higher transaction prices of medicines and the use of a more expensive mix of medicines" — not higher volume. Americans pay more per pill, not for more pills.
The total bill is staggering. U.S. healthcare spending reached $5.7 trillion in 2025 — roughly $17,000 per person, consuming nearly 18% of GDP. Prescription drugs account for approximately $400 billion of that, a number that has doubled in two decades.
Ask most Americans why drugs cost so much, and they'll point to "Big Pharma" — the manufacturers. That's part of the story. But there is another layer of the system that most patients have never heard of, one that operates largely out of public view, that may be doing more to inflate drug costs than the companies that actually make the pills.
They're called Pharmacy Benefit Managers — PBMs — and understanding what they do, how they profit, and whom they serve is the first step toward understanding why a vial of insulin that costs $8 to manufacture can carry a list price north of $300.
This is Part 1 of a four-part series examining why American healthcare costs what it does. We start here, with the drug pricing machine, because it's where the dysfunction is most visible — and where reform is finally, belatedly, beginning to bite.
The Middlemen You've Never Heard Of
A Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM) is a company that sits between you, your insurer, your pharmacy, and the drug manufacturer. If you have prescription drug coverage through an employer or health plan, a PBM is almost certainly managing it — deciding which drugs your plan covers, negotiating the prices, and processing every claim when you fill a prescription.
PBMs were created in the 1960s as simple claims processors — electronic clearinghouses that handled the paperwork of prescription drug benefits. Over the following decades, they evolved into something far more powerful. Today, PBMs perform three core functions:
1. Formulary Management: PBMs create and maintain the list of drugs your insurance will cover (the "formulary") and assign each drug to a tier that determines your copay. A drug on Tier 1 might cost you $10. The same drug on Tier 3 might cost $75. A drug not on the formulary at all? You pay full price.
2. Rebate Negotiation: PBMs negotiate rebates — essentially kickbacks — from drug manufacturers in exchange for favorable formulary placement. A manufacturer might pay a PBM a 30–50% rebate on a drug's list price to ensure it lands on Tier 2 instead of Tier 3, or to keep a competitor off the formulary entirely. These rebates are the economic engine of the PBM industry, and they are the root of much of the dysfunction we're about to explore.
3. Claims Adjudication and Network Management: PBMs process prescription claims in real time, maintain networks of pharmacies, and set the reimbursement rates that pharmacies receive for each prescription they fill.
In theory, PBMs should function as purchasing agents — using their collective bargaining power to drive down drug prices for the insurers and employers that hire them. In practice, the system has evolved into something considerably more complicated, and considerably more profitable — for the PBMs.
The Big Three: A Market Cornered
Three PBMs control approximately 80% of the U.S. prescription drug market:
CVS Caremark — owned by CVS Health, which also owns Aetna (insurance) and CVS Pharmacy (retail pharmacy)
Express Scripts — owned by Cigna Group, which also operates Cigna health insurance and Evernorth health services
OptumRx — owned by UnitedHealth Group, which also runs UnitedHealthcare (the nation's largest insurer) and Optum (healthcare services)
Read that list again, slowly. Each of the three dominant PBMs is owned by a parent company that also runs a major health insurance operation and a pharmacy or healthcare services arm. This is vertical integration on a scale that would make John D. Rockefeller blush.
The conflict of interest is structural and unavoidable. When CVS Caremark negotiates drug prices, it is negotiating on behalf of Aetna's members while simultaneously deciding which drugs get filled at CVS pharmacies — pharmacies owned by the same parent company. When OptumRx manages a formulary, it is making coverage decisions for UnitedHealthcare members while routing prescriptions through Optum's own specialty and mail-order pharmacies.
The FTC has taken notice. In a landmark 2024 interim report, the agency found that the Big Three PBMs managed approximately $400 billion in drug spending for nearly 270 million Americans. The report concluded that this concentration of power, combined with vertical integration, created "perverse incentives" that could raise drug costs rather than lower them.
A second FTC interim report focused on specialty drug markups was even more damning. The agency found that the six largest PBMs marked up specialty drug prices by a median of 284% — sometimes as high as 900% — when dispensed through their affiliated specialty pharmacies. The excess revenue from these markups totaled an estimated $7.3 billion over a four-year period on just a handful of drug classes, including oncology drugs, immunosuppressants, and treatments for multiple sclerosis.
The Rebate Wall: How Cheaper Drugs Get Locked Out
Here is the perverse heart of the PBM business model: PBMs don't necessarily prefer cheaper drugs. They prefer drugs with bigger rebates.
A rebate is a payment from a drug manufacturer to the PBM (and, in theory, to the health plan) in exchange for formulary access. The rebate is calculated as a percentage of the drug's list price — the higher the list price, the larger the dollar value of the rebate. This creates an economic incentive structure that is precisely backwards from what patients need.
Consider a simplified example:
Drug A (incumbent brand): List price $500/month. Manufacturer pays a 60% rebate = $300 back to PBM/plan. Net cost: $200.
Drug B (new competitor): List price $150/month. Manufacturer offers a 20% rebate = $30 back to PBM/plan. Net cost: $120.
Drug B is genuinely cheaper — the net cost to the plan is lower. But the PBM's revenue from the Drug A rebate is ten times larger. Which drug do you think ends up on the formulary?
This is the "rebate wall" — a financial barrier that blocks cheaper drugs from formulary placement because they cannot generate the rebate revenue that incumbent, higher-priced drugs command. The wall doesn't just affect hypothetical drugs. It has real-world consequences that patients feel every day.
The Humira Case Study: $6 Billion in Blocked Savings
The most dramatic illustration of the rebate wall involves Humira (adalimumab), one of the best-selling drugs in pharmaceutical history. When Humira's patents began expiring, multiple biosimilar alternatives — essentially the biologic equivalent of generic drugs — entered the market at significantly lower prices.
In a functional market, these cheaper alternatives would have rapidly captured market share. That's not what happened.
AbbVie, Humira's manufacturer, had built an enormous rebate structure around the drug — reportedly offering rebates of 60–70% or more to PBMs. The company also allegedly tied Humira rebates to rebates on its newer drugs, Skyrizi and Rinvoq — meaning that a PBM that dropped Humira from its formulary risked losing favorable pricing on AbbVie's entire portfolio.
The result? By late 2024, biosimilars had captured less than 2% of the adalimumab market. The Biosimilars Council estimated that PBM rebate schemes cost patients and the healthcare system approximately $6 billion in lost savings. Multiple manufacturer biosimilars — including Hulio, Yuflyma, and Abrilada — were excluded from all three major PBMs' standard commercial formularies.
By 2025, the landscape shifted — but in a way that revealed another layer of the game. Instead of simply adding cheaper biosimilars, the Big Three PBMs introduced "white label" biosimilars produced through exclusive partnerships with select manufacturers. CVS Caremark partnered with Sandoz through its subsidiary Cordavis. Each PBM now offers its own curated adalimumab product — maintaining control over supply, pricing, and profit margins even as Humira itself exits formularies.
The patients who needed affordable adalimumab waited years for savings that the market should have delivered immediately. And when those savings finally arrived, they came through PBM-controlled channels that preserved the middlemen's cut.
Spread Pricing: The Hidden Markup
Spread pricing is one of the simplest — and most opaque — ways PBMs generate profit. Here's how it works:
When you fill a prescription, two financial transactions happen simultaneously. Your health plan pays the PBM a certain amount for that drug. The PBM then pays the pharmacy a different amount — often less. The PBM pockets the difference. That's the "spread."
Example: Your insurer pays the PBM $100 for a prescription. The PBM pays the pharmacy $20. The PBM keeps $80.
You, the patient, never see either number. Your insurer sees only what it paid. The pharmacy sees only what it received. The spread is invisible to everyone except the PBM.
State-level investigations have exposed the scale of this practice. Ohio's 2018 audit of its Medicaid managed care program found that PBMs were charging the state $224 million more per year than they were paying pharmacies — a spread of roughly 9% across all prescriptions, with some generic drugs marked up by 300% or more. The findings were so alarming that Ohio passed legislation banning spread pricing in its Medicaid program.
Multiple states have since followed suit, and the FTC's 2024 report identified spread pricing as a key area of concern, noting that the practice creates a direct incentive for PBMs to steer patients toward drugs with the largest spreads rather than the lowest costs.
DIR Fees: Death by a Thousand Clawbacks
If spread pricing squeezes pharmacies from the front, Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) fees squeeze them from behind.
DIR fees are retroactive charges that PBMs impose on pharmacies — often months after a prescription has been filled and the patient has walked out the door. They are nominally tied to "performance metrics," but the metrics are set by the PBMs themselves, and pharmacies have little ability to predict or contest the amounts.
The impact on independent pharmacies has been devastating. A pharmacy fills a prescription, receives its initial reimbursement, and then months later gets a bill from the PBM clawing back a portion of that payment. The pharmacy has already purchased the drug from its wholesaler, already paid its staff, already dispensed the medication. The clawback is pure loss.
According to the National Community Pharmacists Association, independent pharmacies have been closing at an accelerating rate — roughly 7.5 pharmacies per week in recent years. While multiple factors contribute to these closures, DIR fees are consistently cited as a primary driver. In rural communities, where an independent pharmacy may be the only one within a 30-mile radius, these closures create genuine healthcare deserts.
The Inflation Reduction Act's Medicare reforms eliminated retroactive DIR fees in Medicare Part D starting in 2024, requiring them to be applied at the point of sale instead. This was a meaningful improvement — but it applies only to Medicare, leaving the commercial market largely untouched.
The Reckoning: FTC, Insulin, and the Beginning of Accountability
For decades, PBMs operated in a regulatory blind spot — too powerful to ignore, too complex for most lawmakers to understand, and too deeply embedded in the healthcare system for easy reform. That changed in 2024.
In September 2024, the Federal Trade Commission filed an administrative complaint against all three major PBMs — CVS Caremark, Express Scripts, and OptumRx — alleging that their rebate practices had artificially inflated the price of insulin. The complaint charged that PBMs had systematically favored insulin products with higher list prices and correspondingly higher rebates, even when lower-priced alternatives were available.
Insulin was the perfect test case. The drug has been around for over a century. Its manufacturing cost is low — estimates range from $2 to $8 per vial. Yet U.S. list prices had climbed to $300 or more per vial, with the three major insulin manufacturers (Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, and Sanofi) and three major PBMs locked in what critics described as a "rebate spiral" — manufacturers raising list prices to fund larger rebates, which PBMs demanded in exchange for formulary access, which required higher list prices to fund larger rebates.
The complaint alleged that PBMs had excluded or disadvantaged lower-list-price insulins, pressuring manufacturers to keep list prices high. For patients with high deductibles or coinsurance — who pay a percentage of the list price, not the net price — this meant paying dramatically more out of pocket than the drug's actual cost justified.
By June 2026, all three PBMs had settled with the FTC. The specific settlement terms varied, but each included provisions requiring greater transparency in rebate practices and restrictions on the use of formulary exclusion as a tool to favor high-list-price products.
Congressional Reform: The CAA of 2026
The legislative branch finally acted as well. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2026, signed on February 3, 2026, included the most significant PBM reform legislation in U.S. history:
100% Rebate Pass-Through — For ERISA-governed employer plans (covering the majority of commercially insured Americans), PBMs must now pass through 100% of manufacturer rebates to the health plan. The days of PBMs retaining a slice of every rebate as profit are, at least for these plans, over.
Medicare Part D Delinking — Beginning January 2028, Medicare Part D reimbursement will be delinked from list prices. This dismantles the rebate spiral for the Medicare population — PBMs will no longer profit from higher list prices in the program that covers 65 million Americans.
Transparency Requirements — New reporting obligations require PBMs to disclose rebate amounts, spread pricing margins, and fee structures to plan sponsors.
The law also included provisions for pharmacy "any willing provider" protections, limiting PBMs' ability to steer patients away from independent pharmacies and toward their own affiliated pharmacy chains.
These are real reforms with real teeth. But they took decades to pass, and significant gaps remain — state-regulated plans, the individual market, and much of the specialty drug ecosystem remain only partially addressed. As one health policy analyst noted: this is the beginning of PBM reform, not the end.
Medicare Finally Gets to Negotiate
For most of its existence, Medicare was prohibited by law from negotiating drug prices — an extraordinary restriction that meant the single largest purchaser of prescription drugs in the country had to accept whatever price manufacturers set. The Veterans Affairs system, Medicaid, and even the governments of every other developed nation negotiated; Medicare could not.
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 changed that. For the first time, Medicare was authorized to directly negotiate prices on a select group of high-cost drugs. The first round targeted 10 medications — including Eliquis (apixaban), Jardiance (empagliflozin), Xarelto (rivaroxaban), Entresto (sacubitril/valsartan), and Januvia (sitagliptin) — drugs that collectively accounted for billions in Medicare Part D spending.
The negotiated prices, announced in August 2024 and taking effect January 2026, delivered discounts of 38% to 79% off list prices. The Congressional Budget Office projected savings of approximately $6 billion in the first year alone.
For cardiologists and their patients, the impact was immediate. Eliquis — the most widely prescribed anticoagulant in the country, used by millions of patients with atrial fibrillation — saw its negotiated price drop by roughly 56%. Entresto, the cornerstone of modern heart failure therapy, was discounted by 53%. Jardiance, which carries indications for both diabetes and heart failure, was reduced by 66%.
For SGLT2 inhibitor prescribers, the numbers deserve a closer look. Jardiance — which carries FDA indications for type 2 diabetes, heart failure, and chronic kidney disease — was negotiated down to approximately $197 per month, from a list price north of $570. Farxiga (dapagliflozin), with a similar multi-indication profile, came in at roughly $178.50 per month, down from over $550. For Medicare beneficiaries, these are transformative reductions in the cost of drugs that prevent hospitalizations, slow kidney disease progression, and reduce cardiovascular death.
But the IRA didn't stop at negotiation. Two other provisions quietly changed the affordability landscape for millions of seniors:
The $2,000 Out-of-Pocket Cap — Beginning in 2025, Medicare Part D beneficiaries pay no more than $2,000 per year in total out-of-pocket drug costs. Before this cap, patients in the coverage gap could face thousands in annual spending. An estimated 3.2 million Medicare enrollees benefit from this protection.
The $35 Insulin Cap — Medicare beneficiaries now pay no more than $35 per month for covered insulin products, regardless of the number of prescriptions. For the roughly 3.4 million Medicare beneficiaries who use insulin, this eliminated the nightmare of choosing between rent and a drug that costs $8 to manufacture.
The second round of negotiations targets 15 additional drugs — including Ozempic and Wegovy (semaglutide) — for prices effective in January 2027. A third round — 15 more drugs, including Part B medications — will follow for 2028.
The pharmaceutical industry has challenged these negotiations in court, arguing they constitute unconstitutional "compelled speech" and violate due process. As of mid-2026, multiple federal courts have rejected these challenges. The program is proceeding.
Taken together, the IRA's drug provisions represent the most significant expansion of medication affordability for seniors since Medicare Part D was created in 2003. For the 65-and-over population, the system genuinely improved.
The question is what happened next — and who got left behind.
The Access Paradox: The Drug Got Cheaper — The Door Got Narrower
Here is the part of the story that doesn't fit neatly into anyone's political narrative.
In April 2025, the current administration signed Executive Order 14273, directing the Department of Health and Human Services to continue IRA drug price negotiations and address the so-called "pill penalty" — the disparity in Medicare cost-sharing between physician-administered drugs (Part B) and oral medications (Part D) that can make a pill more expensive to the patient than an infusion of the same drug class. The administration publicly claimed credit for the negotiated price reductions that took effect in January 2026 — reductions that were, in fact, the product of legislation passed three years earlier under the previous administration and negotiations conducted by career CMS officials.
Independent fact-checkers noted the disconnect. But credit-claiming is bipartisan sport, and in isolation it would be a footnote. What matters — what affects patients — is what happened alongside the price reductions.
The Medicaid Cuts
On July 4, 2025, the President signed a reconciliation bill that included approximately $700 billion in Medicaid cuts over a decade — the largest reduction in safety-net healthcare spending in American history. Work requirements, redetermination acceleration, and per-capita cap structures were projected to result in millions of Americans losing coverage. The Senate version of the bill, still being negotiated in early 2026, proposed cuts exceeding $1 trillion.
The Senate version also dropped most of the drug-pricing provisions that the House had included — including expanded negotiation authority and commercial market reforms — retaining only a narrow fix for orphan drug exclusions. In other words: the same legislative vehicle that could have extended IRA-style affordability protections to the under-65 population was used instead to shrink the safety net that many of those patients depend on.
Think about what this means in practice. The Medicare population got genuinely cheaper SGLT2 inhibitors. But the Medicaid population — lower-income patients with higher rates of diabetes, heart failure, and CKD, and who are disproportionately Black and Hispanic — faced the prospect of losing drug coverage entirely. The door to the pharmacy didn't just stay narrow. For millions of patients, it started closing.
The SGLT2 Inhibitor Case Study: A Drug That Works — When Patients Can Get It
SGLT2 inhibitors are, by any evidence-based measure, among the most important cardiovascular drugs developed in the last two decades. They reduce cardiovascular death, prevent heart failure hospitalizations, slow progression of chronic kidney disease, and improve glycemic control — all in a single oral medication. Guidelines from the ACC/AHA, ADA, and KDIGO recommend them across multiple indications.
For Medicare patients, the IRA made these drugs meaningfully more affordable. For everyone else, affordability depends on the same system this article has been describing — and the system is not cooperating.
Consider the commercial insurance landscape:
~40% of commercially insured lives face step therapy or prior authorization requirements before an SGLT2 inhibitor prescription can be filled.
A 2024 study found that prior authorization delays for SGLT2 inhibitors led to a two-fold increase in patients who never received the drug at all — not delayed, but never treated.
Black and Hispanic patients were disproportionately affected — reflecting well-documented disparities in insurance coverage, pharmacy access, and the administrative burden of navigating prior authorization systems.
Cash prices without insurance: $550–$900 per month for brand-name empagliflozin or dapagliflozin.
There is a genuine bright spot: generic dapagliflozin launched in April 2026, bringing the first generic SGLT2 inhibitor to market. Early cash prices have dropped significantly — a development that, over time, should improve commercial access independent of insurance negotiations. But generic availability doesn't eliminate prior authorization requirements, doesn't help patients who've already lost Medicaid coverage, and takes time to filter through formulary decisions.
The pattern that emerges is not subtle. Medicare negotiation made SGLT2 inhibitors affordable for seniors. A generic is beginning to help the commercially insured. But the population in between — too young for Medicare, too poor to pay cash, dependent on Medicaid — is the population being squeezed by coverage cuts at the exact moment these drugs became both cheaper and more evidence-based than ever.
A drug that costs $197 per month is meaningless if you no longer have insurance. A negotiated price is irrelevant if prior authorization means you never get the prescription filled. The access paradox is this: America finally figured out how to make these drugs affordable, and then made it harder for the most vulnerable patients to reach them.
Mark Cuban's Radical Experiment: What If We Just... Showed the Price?
In January 2022, billionaire entrepreneur Mark Cuban launched Cost Plus Drugs with a premise so simple it was almost absurd: buy generic medications at their actual manufacturing cost, add a transparent 15% markup, charge a $3–5 pharmacy labor fee and a $5 shipping fee, and show the entire breakdown to the customer.
No rebates. No spread pricing. No hidden fees. No formulary games. Just the drug, its real cost, and a modest, disclosed margin.
The price differences are sometimes jaw-dropping:
Imatinib (generic Gleevec, a leukemia drug): Retail price ~$2,500/month → Cost Plus price: ~$19
Abiraterone (prostate cancer): Retail price ~$6,140/month → Cost Plus price: ~$67
These aren't anomalies. The company now carries approximately 2,500 medications and has built its own manufacturing facility in Dallas, Texas.
The Cost Plus model has genuine limitations. It's primarily a mail-order pharmacy, which doesn't work for every patient or every medication. It carries mostly generics, not brand-name drugs (where the rebate game is most entrenched). A 2026 analysis in the American Journal of Managed Care found that Cost Plus beat commercial insurance copays about 80% of the time — but on low-cost generics already available cheaply at retail pharmacies, the per-prescription fees can actually make Cost Plus more expensive.
But the significance of Cost Plus isn't just in the savings it provides to individual patients. It's in what it reveals: that the gap between what a drug actually costs and what Americans are charged is not a natural feature of the market. It's a consequence of a system designed to obscure prices, reward opacity, and profit from complexity.
When you can buy the same generic drug for $19 through a transparent model that someone is buying at $2,500 through the PBM-rebate system, the system is not working. It is working as designed — and the design serves the middlemen, not the patients.
Cuban has been characteristically blunt about this: "The entire PBM industry is built on opacity. Their margin is your misery."
The Affordable Drug Paradox: When Cheaper Means Excluded
The rebate wall doesn't just affect generics and biosimilars. It poses a structural challenge for any new drug that tries to come to market at an affordable price — because in the current system, affordable means low rebates, and low rebates mean poor formulary access.
Consider the challenge facing NewAmsterdam Pharma, a company developing obicetrapib, a next-generation CETP inhibitor for LDL cholesterol lowering. In SEC filings, the company has stated that obicetrapib's low manufacturing cost should enable "favorable pricing" — language that signals an intention to price below existing branded LDL-lowering therapies like PCSK9 inhibitors (which carry list prices of $5,000–$14,000 per year).
The intention is laudable. But here's the trap: if obicetrapib launches at, say, $2,000/year when competitors are listed at $10,000/year, the competitors can offer PBMs rebates of 60–70% (yielding $6,000–$7,000 per patient in rebate revenue) while obicetrapib's rebate on a $2,000 price — even at the same percentage — generates a fraction of that amount. The PBM's financial incentive is to keep the expensive drug on the formulary and exclude the affordable one.
This isn't a theoretical concern. It's the same dynamic that delayed biosimilar adoption for Humira, and it's the reason that health policy experts describe the rebate system as a "tax on affordability" — a system that punishes companies for pricing their drugs reasonably.
We don't yet know how obicetrapib's U.S. pricing and formulary access will play out — the drug is still awaiting regulatory decisions in Europe (expected in the second half of 2026) and has not yet announced a U.S. launch price. But the structural challenge it faces illustrates a fundamental dysfunction: in the current PBM system, a drug can be too cheap to succeed.
What This Means When You're the Patient
The consequences of this system are not abstract. They are measured in patients who ration insulin because they can't afford the copay. They are measured in cancer patients who delay treatment while navigating prior authorization requirements. They are measured in the rural communities that lose their only pharmacy because DIR fee clawbacks made the business unsustainable.
A few numbers that put the patient impact in perspective:
Medication non-adherence due to cost affects an estimated 8% of American adults — roughly 20 million people who skip doses, split pills, or don't fill prescriptions because of out-of-pocket costs. In cardiovascular medicine, non-adherence to statins, antihypertensives, and anticoagulants directly translates to increased rates of heart attacks, strokes, and death.
The deductible trap is particularly cruel. A patient with a $3,000 deductible pays 100% of drug costs until that threshold is met. Because the cost counted against the deductible is based on the list price (before rebates), the patient effectively subsidizes the rebate system during the months they're paying out of pocket. The rebate goes to the PBM and the plan; the patient pays the inflated list price.
Prior authorization — the requirement that a PBM approve a prescription before it's covered — has become one of the most common sources of treatment delay in American medicine. An American Medical Association survey found that 94% of physicians reported care delays associated with prior authorization, and 33% reported that prior authorization had led to a serious adverse event for a patient in their care.
For cardiometabolic patients specifically, the stakes are particularly high. The drugs at the center of this system — statins, PCSK9 inhibitors, SGLT2 inhibitors, GLP-1 receptor agonists, anticoagulants — are not optional luxuries. They are medications that prevent heart attacks, strokes, kidney failure, and death. When the pricing system makes these drugs inaccessible, people die. It is that straightforward.
Why Only Here? The International Perspective
The PBM model is a uniquely American phenomenon. No other developed country uses private, for-profit intermediaries to manage drug pricing in this way. Here's why U.S. drug costs are outliers:
Every other developed nation negotiates drug prices directly. The UK's National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) evaluates drugs based on cost-effectiveness and negotiates prices with manufacturers. Canada's Patented Medicine Prices Review Board caps prices. Germany allows free pricing at launch but mandates negotiation after one year. Japan sets prices through a government-administered schedule. In each case, a government entity serves as the counterparty to the drug manufacturer — not a profit-seeking intermediary.
The result: the same drugs, made by the same companies, sold to the same patient populations, cost two to four times more in the United States.
The common defense of this disparity goes something like this: other nations freeload off American innovation. Their government price controls suppress what manufacturers can charge, so pharmaceutical companies must recoup their R&D costs in the one market that still pays — the U.S. Under this view, American patients are subsidizing the world's medicines, and that's the price of capitalism working as intended.
There is a grain of truth in this argument — and a mountain of misdirection. An NBER working paper by Frech, Pauly, and colleagues estimated that the United States provides roughly 73% of the worldwide financial incentive for pharmaceutical innovation, with the rest of the world contributing about 27%. The U.S. market is, indisputably, where the money is.
But here's what the "subsidizing innovation" narrative leaves out. A 2019 Health Affairs study of 15 major pharmaceutical companies found that U.S. revenue premiums over other countries totaled approximately $116 billion per year. Of that, only about 66% went back into R&D. The rest went to profits, stock buybacks, executive compensation, and marketing — the last of which, at roughly $30 billion per year, actually exceeds what many companies spend on research.
More fundamentally, the pricing gap between the U.S. and the rest of the world is not a story about manufacturers charging what they need to fund research. Pharmaceutical companies are profitable in every major market. Novo Nordisk is not a charity in Denmark. Roche is not struggling in Switzerland. AstraZeneca turns a profit in the UK. What differs is not whether manufacturers get paid — it's how many hands the money passes through before reaching them. The U.S. doesn't have a free market for prescription drugs. It has the most intermediated market in the world — and the intermediaries are the ones charging admission.
When a PBM retains a share of a manufacturer rebate, marks up a specialty drug by 284%, or pockets an $80 spread on a generic prescription, that money doesn't fund a single clinical trial. The middlemen are extracting from the system on top of whatever the manufacturer charges — and none of it goes to R&D. The innovation subsidy argument, even where it applies to manufacturer pricing, has nothing to do with PBM profits.
The Innovation Pipeline: Cutting the Roots While Defending the Fruit
If the defense of high U.S. drug prices rests on America's role as the world's pharmaceutical innovator, that defense is developing a serious crack — not from the pricing system, but from the other end of the pipeline.
The vast majority of breakthrough drugs don't begin in a pharmaceutical company's lab. They begin in university research centers, funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). A landmark PNAS study found that NIH-funded research contributed to the published science behind every single one of the 210 new drugs approved by the FDA from 2010 to 2016 — and more than 90% of that funding supported basic research, the foundational science that identifies drug targets long before a pharmaceutical company begins clinical trials. A separate JAMA Health Forum analysis confirmed the pattern across 387 drugs approved through 2019.
This is the pipeline that is now being dismantled.
In 2025 and 2026, sweeping disruptions to NIH funding — including mass grant terminations, a controversial forward-funding mechanism that reduces the number of new awards, and proposed budget cuts of up to 40% — have thrown the U.S. biomedical research enterprise into crisis. By mid-fiscal year 2026, the NIH had awarded 74% fewer competitive grants than the average for the same period in prior years. Grant success rates have fallen to approximately 17% — the lowest in nearly three decades. Thousands of mid-research grants have been terminated early.
The effects are not theoretical. University cardiology and cardiovascular research programs — the same labs that produced the foundational science behind SGLT2 inhibitors, PCSK9 inhibitors, and GLP-1 receptor agonists — are losing funding, laying off researchers, and shelving projects. When NIH grants dry up, they don't just pause research — they dismantle teams. A postdoctoral researcher who leaves for industry or another country doesn't come back when the grant resumes. The institutional knowledge walks out the door.
This creates a bitter irony at the heart of the drug pricing debate. The argument that Americans must pay more for drugs to fund innovation rings hollow when the same political system that defends high drug prices is simultaneously defunding the basic research that produces the innovations. You cannot claim that high prices are justified by America's role as the world's pharmaceutical innovator while cutting the roots of that innovation. The pharmaceutical industry doesn't fund basic science — it commercializes basic science. And basic science runs on NIH grants.
If the current trajectory continues, the U.S. won't just lose its position as the global leader in biomedical research. It will have created the worst of both worlds: the highest drug prices in the world and a declining research pipeline. Americans will still be subsidizing something — just not innovation.
In Fairness: What PBMs Get Right
It would be intellectually dishonest to paint PBMs as purely parasitic. They do serve real functions:
Aggregate purchasing power. By pooling millions of covered lives, PBMs can negotiate prices that no individual employer or patient could achieve alone. This is genuine value — and for some drug classes, particularly commoditized generics, the competition among PBMs does produce lower costs.
Utilization management. PBMs implement drug utilization review, step therapy protocols, and formulary tiering that can steer prescribing toward clinically equivalent but less expensive options. When done well, this is evidence-based cost management. When done poorly, it's a prior authorization nightmare that delays care.
Administrative infrastructure. The real-time claims processing network that PBMs operate is genuinely complex and genuinely necessary. Someone has to adjudicate the 6.7 billion prescriptions Americans fill each year. PBMs do this efficiently.
The question isn't whether PBMs provide any value. It's whether the value they provide is worth the cost they impose — and whether a system this concentrated, this opaque, and this conflicted can ever truly serve patients' interests. The FTC's findings, the insulin settlements, and the legislative reforms of 2026 all suggest that the answer, for now, is no.
THE BOTTOM LINE
The U.S. drug pricing system is not broken. It is functioning exactly as its incentive structures predict — rewarding opacity, punishing affordability, and concentrating profit in a layer of intermediaries that most patients don't know exist.
PBMs began as simple claims processors and evolved into vertically integrated conglomerates controlling $400 billion in drug spending for 270 million Americans. Their rebate-based business model creates a financial incentive to prefer expensive drugs over cheap ones, to block affordable competitors, and to extract value at every transaction between the manufacturer and the patient.
Reform is underway — the FTC's enforcement actions, the CAA 2026 reforms, Medicare price negotiation, and transparent pricing models like Cost Plus Drugs all represent meaningful progress. But the system evolved over decades, and it will not be dismantled in a single legislative session.
What you can do: Ask your pharmacist what your drug actually costs without insurance. Check costplusdrugs.com for your generic medications. Ask your employer's benefits team whether your PBM passes through 100% of rebates. Know your formulary — and know that being on a lower tier doesn't always mean the drug is cheaper, it means it's more profitable for someone in the chain. Your awareness is the first crack in the wall.
Why Healthcare Costs So Much
Part 1: The Drug Pricing Machine — You are here
Part 2: The Facility Fee Game — Coming soon
Part 3: Private Equity's Healthcare Play — Coming soon
Part 4: The Doctor Myth — Coming soon
Your heart doesn't care about your copay tier. Neither should your treatment.
— CardioAdvocate
CardioAdvocate provides medical education content for informational purposes only. This article does not constitute medical, legal, or financial advice. Healthcare policy and drug pricing are complex and evolving — specific details may change after publication. Always consult qualified professionals for medical, legal, and financial decisions. CardioAdvocate has no financial relationship with Mark Cuban Cost Plus Drugs, NewAmsterdam Pharma, or any PBM. © 2026 CardioAdvocate. All rights reserved.